Not Making Sales Paid Too Well for Pharmaceutical Reps: Why the Result in Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. Makes Sense Even if Its Statutory Construction Does Not by Hurtt, Robert J., Jr.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 57 
Number 4 Statutory Interpretation (Summer 
2013) 
Article 9 
2013 
Not Making Sales Paid Too Well for Pharmaceutical Reps: Why 
the Result in Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. Makes 
Sense Even if Its Statutory Construction Does Not 
Robert J. Hurtt Jr. 
rhurtt@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Hurtt Jr., Not Making Sales Paid Too Well for Pharmaceutical Reps: Why the Result in 
Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. Makes Sense Even if Its Statutory Construction Does Not, 57 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol57/iss4/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, 
please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1019 
NOT MAKING SALES PAID TOO WELL FOR PHARMACEUTICAL 
REPS: WHY THE RESULT IN CHRISTOPHER V. SMITHKLINE 
BEECHAM CORP. MAKES SENSE EVEN IF ITS STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1020 
I. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................ 1023 
A.  Contours of the FLSA ....................................................................... 1023 
1.  The Act’s History and Rationale ................................................. 1023 
2.  The Secretary’s Definitions and Delimitations ........................... 1025 
B.  Interpreting the Provisions ............................................................... 1027 
C.  Other Outside Sales Cases ............................................................... 1029 
D. Christopher’s Outside Sales Application .......................................... 1032 
1.  The Ninth Circuit’s Approach ..................................................... 1032 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority Agrees ................. 1034 
3.  The Liberal Justices’ Dissent ....................................................... 1036 
II. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 1038 
A.  The Agency’s Interpretation Was Not Entitled to Deference ........... 1038 
B.  PSRs Do Not Fall Plainly and Unmistakably Within the 
Exemption’s Terms ........................................................................... 1039 
C.  What About the Exemption’s Spirit? ................................................ 1041 
1.  “Excessively Low Wages ............................................................ 1042 
2.  “Excessively Long Hours” and Job-Spreadings .......................... 1043 
III. NON-JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS .................................................................... 1044 
A.  The Secretary Could Have Expanded the Definition of Sale ............ 1044 
B.  Congress Could Have Amended the Act ........................................... 1045 
C.  Or the Pharmaceutical Industry Could Have Adapted ..................... 1045 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1047 
 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1020 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1019 
INTRODUCTION 
The American pharmaceutical market, a $300 billion industry,1 is currently 
navigating a period of great uncertainty, with issues ranging from the unclear 
impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 to the upcoming 
expiration of numerous major patents3 to continued industry consolidation.4 
All three factors are placing an enormous strain on pharmaceutical sales 
representatives (“PSRs” or “Reps”), the heart of drugmakers’ sales efforts.5 
Not long ago, these sales representatives, also known as detailers,6 owned 
highly sought-after positions with salaries sometimes reaching six figures.7 
The enviable base pay was only part of the story; these workers commonly 
earned an additional twenty-five percent of their total compensation through 
incentive-based bonuses.8 At its height, the PSR job market in the U.S. 
comprised more than 100,000 workers.9 However, the field has shed more than 
25,000 of those jobs since 2006 as the economy has contracted and 
pharmaceutical giants have merged.10 Further, doctors have become more 
 
 1. Gary Gatyas, IMS Institute Reports U.S. Spending on Medicines Grew 2.3 Percent in 
2010, to $307.4 Billion, IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (April 19, 2011), 
http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims (follow “The IMS Institute” hyperlink; then follow 
“Biopharma Forecasts & Trends” hyperlink; then follow “19 Apr 2011” hyperlink). 
 2. Arthur Daemmrich, U.S. Healthcare Reform and the Pharmaceutical Industry 22 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-015, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/ 
pdf/12-015.pdf. 
 3. Barbara Martinez & Jacob Goldstein, Big Pharma Faces Grim Prognosis, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119689933952615133.html. 
 4. Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives: A Slowly Vanishing Breed?, INFOGROK 
BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Vanishing], http://www.infog 
rok.com/index.php/carousel/pharmaceutical-sales-representatives-a-slowly-vanishing-breed.html. 
 5. Id. (noting that experts point to continued industry consolidation as the largest reason the 
PSR field has shrunk over the past five years). 
 6. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 
S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 7. Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(although the plaintiff earned only $84,000 per year, her colleagues in more senior sales positions 
earned more than $100,000 annually in base pay). 
 8. Elliot Scott, Pharmaceutical Sales Compensation: Past, Present and Future, TOWERS 
WATSON (2010), http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/1404/WT_2010_15814.pdf (showing 
more than half of the PSRs who visit primary care doctors receive a 75/25 compensation split, 
and only four percent receive less than twenty percent of their salary through bonuses). Because 
PSRs cannot sell drugs directly to doctors or patients, these bonuses instead are based on the 
number of prescriptions of a Rep’s promoted drugs that are prescribed by physicians within a 
Rep’s sales territory. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 387. 
 9. Jeanne Whalen, Drug Makers Replace Reps with Digital Tools, WALL ST. J., May 10, 
2011, at B7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703702004576268772 
294316518.html. 
 10. Id. 
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resistant to visits from sales representatives,11 a factor that has led drugmakers 
to turn increasingly to e-detailing as an alternative to employing human Reps.12 
PSRs did not leave their jobs quietly. Some joined class action lawsuits 
against their former employers, claiming they were due unpaid overtime under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or the “Act”).13 The fight boiled down 
to the definition of “sales” and its unique application to PSRs, who are 
prevented by federal law from actually selling drugs.14 Because a 
pharmaceutical company cannot make direct sales of its prescription drugs, its 
sales force instead targets physicians as the necessary intermediary to reach the 
products’ end users.15 PSRs do not sell the drugs directly to the doctors; they 
can only promote the drugs, provide free samples, and sell doctors on the idea 
of prescribing them.16 If these activities qualify as “sales” within the Act’s 
definition, then PSRs meet the FLSA’s outside sales exemption requirements,17 
rendering the employer exempt from paying them overtime wages.18 If the 
 
 11. Vanishing, supra note 4. Drug companies have lessened their dependence on sales 
representatives as their work has faced greater pushback from physicians. Id. A survey found 
twenty-three percent of doctors now totally refuse to see sales representatives, and a growing 
number are requiring sales representatives to set appointments in order to see them. Ben Comer, 
Docs Are Visited by 20 Reps a Week, Survey Says, MEDICAL MARKETING & MEDIA (Oct. 14, 
2010), http://www.mmm-online.com/docs-are-visited-by-20-reps-a-week-survey-says/article/180 
995. 
 12. Whalen, supra note 9, at B7; see also Amy Barrett, Pharmaceutical Companies Replace 
Sales Reps with Websites, DAILYFINANCE (June 24, 2010, 3:20 PM), http://www.daily 
finance.com/2010/06/24/pharmaceutical-companies-replace-sales-reps-with-websites (noting that 
drugmakers such as AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson have begun using call centers and 
online operations to provide samples and drug information to doctors). 
 13. See cases cited infra note 20. Companies are not allowed to retaliate against employees 
for joining these lawsuits against them. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
Still, the fact that names of members of the plaintiff class are available on the federal court docket 
likely has a chilling effect on current employees. Jim Edwards, Lay Us Off, Will You? Hundreds 
Axed at Pfizer Sign Up for Overtime Lawsuit, CBS MONEYWATCH (June 13, 2011, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-42848716/lay-us-off-will-you-hundreds-axed-at-
pfizer-sign-up-for-overtime-lawsuit/?tag=bnetdomain. 
 14. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006). Prescription drugs cannot 
be dispensed to their end users without the authorization of a “practitioner, other than a 
pharmacist.” Id. § 829(b). 
 15. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 396 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 16. See id.; see also Prescription Drug Marketing Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(1) (“No person 
may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to sell, purchase, or trade any drug sample.”). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 18. MARC LINDER, “MOMENTS ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PROFIT”: OVERTIME AND THE 
DEREGULATION OF WORKING HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 213 (2000) 
(explaining the confusion over use of the term “exemption” in the Act by noting the legislation 
was written from the employer’s viewpoint: “It is therefore the employer who is exempt—from 
the burden of paying the minimum wage or mandatory overtime.”). 
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workers do not make sales, then the exemption does not cover them, entitling 
the Reps to overtime pay.19 The federal circuits split on the answer.20 
The Second Circuit, in In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation, found 
PSRs do not make sales, a decision that left the drugmaker open to an 
estimated $100 million in liability for unpaid overtime to 2,500 sales 
representatives.21 A few months later, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit found PSRs do in fact qualify for the outside sales 
exemption.22 After denying certiorari in Novartis, the Supreme Court granted it 
in Christopher and affirmed that decision.23 Although the Court resolved the 
split in a 5-4 decision that reached a common-sense result,24 the way it 
achieved that result is troubling. Ruling that PSRs are not entitled to overtime 
pay better meshes with the policy behind the Act’s exemptions, but the Court 
could reach that result only through a loose interpretation of the statute’s terms, 
an approach that is discouraged when interpreting remedial legislation.25 That 
said, the dissent’s approach would not have been any better. Although its 
analysis of the statutory text and regulations of the Secretary of Labor 
(“Secretary”) made more sense, the result—that highly paid sales 
representatives would be entitled to significant overtime pay as well—seems 
mostly against the spirit and purpose of the exemption.26 
This Note first will examine the FLSA’s statutory language, as well as the 
Secretary’s interpretations of this language, while keeping the Act’s history 
and rationale behind its exemptions in mind. Other recent applications of the 
 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 20. Compare Christopher, 635 F.3d at 400–01 (finding PSRs meet the outside sales 
exemption), with In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011) (finding PSRs do not qualify under this exemption, so they must 
be paid for overtime hours). For other cases that found PSRs fall under an FLSA exemption, see 
Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669, 687 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 372 F. App’x 246 (3d 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 332 (2010); Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 663 F. Supp. 
2d 674, 700 (S.D. Ind. 2009), aff’d, 679 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2012); Barnick v. Wyeth, 522 F. Supp. 
2d 1257, 1263–65 (C.D. Cal. 2007). For other cases ruling PSRs did not qualify under the outside 
sales exemption, see Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 384 F. App’x 17, 19 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1567 (2011); Jirak v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 740, 749 (N.D. Ill. 
2010), rev’d sub nom, 679 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2012); Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 
F. Supp. 2d 459, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 585 F. 
Supp. 2d 308, 323 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 21. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 144, 155. In January 2012, the company reached a settlement 
that would provide class members with up to $99 million. Chad Bray, Novartis Settles U.S. 
Overtime Case, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 
001424052970203718504577183131865055056.html. 
 22. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 383, 400–01. 
 23. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2174 (2012). 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See infra Part II.C. 
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outside sales exemption will be addressed, and the Ninth Circuit’s Christopher 
decision will be re-examined. Finally, the Supreme Court’s opinion will be 
analyzed with the focus on whether PSRs plainly and unmistakably fall within 
the statutory language for the outside sales exemption. The argument is that the 
Court should have found that PSRs do not plainly and unmistakably fall within 
the exemption’s terms, and thus, they are not exempt.27 This result runs counter 
to what the Ninth Circuit considered “common sense,” but this problem’s ideal 
solution should not have been found in the judicial branch.28 Instead, both the 
legislature and the Department of Labor (“Department” or “DOL”) were better 
positioned to create a solution remaining true to both the terms and spirit of the 
Act.29 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Contours of the FLSA 
1. The Act’s History and Rationale 
The 1930s saw a wave of labor legislation, and numerous statutes and 
industry codes that directly preceded the FLSA capped the number of hours 
certain employees could work.30 Providing overtime pay for additional hours 
was primarily a secondary issue.31 The top priority of these initiatives was to 
fight the staggering unemployment of the Great Depression.32 Congress 
showed a similar intent when it passed the FLSA in 1938. The Act’s stated 
purpose was to promote the “health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers” by creating minimum standards for employers.33 Further evidence 
that Congress intended the Act mainly to combat unemployment by spreading 
work can be found in the legislative record.34 
 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. See infra Part III. 
 29. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 30. LINDER, supra note 18, at 37–39 (noting the President’s Reemployment Agreement of 
1933 helped prompt a variety of industry codes that limited workers’ hours). 
 31. Id. Guaranteeing overtime pay was not a direct goal of these industry codes; rather, it 
was an indirect consequence to the codes’ exceptions for work hour limits. Id. Most of these 
codes provided for additional compensation, usually at the rate of time and a half, for instances 
when an employee’s workweek was allowed to be extended past the prescribed limit. Id. 
 32. Robert VanGiezen & Albert F. Schwenk, Compensation From Before World War I 
Through the Great Depression, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2003). U.S. unemployment 
rates peaked at twenty-five percent in 1933. 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
 34. While debating the Act, Senator Alben Barkley said, “I believe it will be socially, 
economically, and industrially more wholesome and safe for all the available labor in America to 
be able to work three-fourths of the time than for three-fourths of it to work all the time and one-
fourth never to work.” LINDER, supra note 18, at 43 (quoting 81 CONG. REC. 7941 (1937)). After 
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The key components of the Act created a standard forty-hour work week,35 
and employees who worked beyond that limit were entitled to extra 
compensation in the form of time-and-a-half overtime payment.36 Although 
this provision, viewed from our twenty-first century perspective, seems clearly 
aimed at rewarding hard workers, the expected result at the time was for work 
to be spread to the unemployed as employers sought to avoid paying the 
overtime rate.37 
The Act includes numerous exceptions,38 including ones for certain white-
collar workers who are exempted from overtime pay.39 In Section 13(a)(1), the 
Act specifically excludes “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside 
salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by 
regulations of the Secretary [of Labor]).”40 
Outside salesmen were excluded from overtime pay because their work 
went largely unsupervised.41 This freedom made it difficult for employers to 
control the number of hours the salesmen worked, so it made little sense to 
compensate these employees on an hourly basis.42 Further, salesmen usually 
earned commissions for their sales, which would compensate them in lieu of 
overtime.43 In fact, the Secretary recently noted that the administrative and 
outside sales exceptions were carved out under the rationale that white-collar 
workers already were paid well above the minimum wage.44 These workers 
 
an amendment was suggested that would require employers to also pay time and a half for 
graveyard shift workers, the chair of the House Labor Committee noted: “[I]f we could do this it 
would do more to spread employment than any other thing concerned in the bill. That is the 
purpose of the bill—to try to spread employment.” LINDER, supra note 18, at 43 (quoting 82 
CONG. REC. 1696 (1937) (statement of Rep. Mary Norton)). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Actually, the Act created a forty-four hour week for the first year it 
was in effect, followed by a decline to forty-two hours in its second year. Id. Today’s standard 
forty-hour work week began in the third year after the Act’s passage. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942) (finding 
that the intent of the Act was not solely to boost substandard wages, but also to apply financial 
pressure on businesses to “spread employment to avoid the extra wage”). 
 38. LINDER, supra note 18, at xvii (calling the Act “profoundly flawed” because of “an 
enormous number of exclusions and exemptions”). 
 39. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 207–08 (10th Cir. 1941). 
 42. Id. (explaining that an outside salesman “can earn as much or as little, within the range 
of his ability, as his ambition dictates”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, 
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,123–24 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). 
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also frequently received more fringe benefits due to their positions.45 The 
Secretary further explained: 
[T]he type of work [white-collar workers] performed was difficult to 
standardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to other workers 
after 40 hours in a week, making compliance with the overtime provisions 
difficult and generally precluding the potential job expansion intended by the 
FLSA’s time-and-a-half overtime premium.46 
2. The Secretary’s Definitions and Delimitations 
Congress did not define the white-collar exemption terms and instead 
explicitly left that job to the Secretary.47 In Auer v. Robbins, the Supreme 
Court recognized the Secretary’s “broad authority to ‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’ 
the scope of the exemption for executive, administrative, and professional 
employees.”48 Under the Secretary’s published regulation, “outside salesman” 
is defined as an employee: 
(1) Whose primary duty is: (i) making sales within the meaning of section 3(k) 
of the Act, or (ii) obtaining orders or contracts for services or for the use of 
facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and 
(2) Who is customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place 
or places of business in performing such primary duty.49 
“Primary duty” is defined as “the principal, main, major or most important 
duty that the employee performs.”50 
Section 3(k) of the FLSA explains that “‘[s]ale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, 
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other 
disposition.”51 The Secretary’s regulations provide: 
Sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title 
to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of 
intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes 
 
 45. Id. at 22,124. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 48. 519 U.S. 452, 456 (1997). Although the Court in Auer did not expressly address the 
outside sales exemption, there should be no doubt that the Secretary’s authority to define terms 
extends to that exemption as well since the statutory phrase “as such terms are defined and 
delimited” immediately follows the outside sales portion of the exemption. 
 49. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1) (2011). This note does not address the requirement to be 
“regularly engaged” away from the employer’s place of business because that issue is not in 
dispute for PSRs, who spend the majority of their workdays visiting doctors. Likewise, there is no 
argument about the inapplicability of the “placing orders” prong, since PSRs do not take drug 
orders from doctors. The entire issue centers on the first part: whether PSRs make sales within the 
statutory definition. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. 
 50. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k). 
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any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or 
other disposition.52 
In 2004, the Secretary released further guidance on what an employer must 
do to show an employee falls under one of the FLSA’s white-collar 
exemptions.53 Those guidelines note that “[a]n employer cannot meet this 
requirement unless it demonstrates objectively that the employee, in some 
sense, has made sales.”54 “Employees have a primary duty of making sales if 
they ‘obtain a commitment to buy’ from the customer and are credited with the 
sale.”55 Thus, sales and promotional work are differentiated under the 
regulations. The regulation explains that people who make sales also 
commonly perform promotional work, but whether that promotional work is 
exempt depends on whether it is performed “incidental to and in conjunction 
with an employee’s own outside sales.”56 If the promotional work is incidental 
to sales made by someone else, it is not exempt.57 Further, the Secretary’s 2004 
guidance emphasized that the Department did not “intend to change any of the 
essential elements required for the outside sales exemption.”58 To qualify, the 
“employee’s primary duty must be to make sales . . . . Extending the outside 
sales exemption to include all promotion work, whether or not connected to an 
employee’s own sales, would contradict this primary duty test.”59 
Because the FLSA is remedial legislation,60 its language should be 
construed liberally to advance its purpose:61 spreading labor to protect workers 
“unable to protect themselves from excessively low wages and excessively 
 
 52. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). 
 53. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,122. 
 54. Id. at 22,162 (distinguishing sales from pure promotional work). 
 55. Id. at 22,162–63 (citation omitted) (“In borderline cases the test is whether the person is 
actually engaged in activities directed toward the consummation of his own sales, at least to the 
extent of obtaining a commitment to buy from the person to whom he is selling. If his efforts are 
directed toward stimulating the sales of his company generally rather than the consummation of 
his own specific sales his activities are not exempt.”). 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,162. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) 
(“[T]hese provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, are remedial and 
humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with 
the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to 
the use and profit of others. Those are the rights that Congress has specially legislated to 
protect.”). 
 61. Id. (“Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.”); 
see also Ne. Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (broadly defining 
“employee” because it found clear legislative intent in the amendment to protect longshoremen). 
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long hours.”62 Likewise, exceptions within remedial legislation should be 
construed narrowly in order to achieve their legislative purpose.63 Thus, the 
FLSA’s outside sales exemption should be narrowly construed against the 
employer seeking to assert it.64 The exemption applies only to employees 
“plainly and unmistakably within [the] terms and spirit” of the exemption.65 
Further, the employer bears the burden to prove the employee does in fact 
qualify for an exemption.66 
B. Interpreting the Provisions 
Statutory interpretation always begins by examining the text,67 and 
statutory language is to be followed when clear.68 However, when statutory 
language is ambiguous, an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers 
may be entitled to deference.69 This Auer deference is given so long as the 
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”70 Likewise, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation receives deference unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
 
 62. LINDER, supra note 18, at 48 (quoting “Message from the President,” in 82 CONG. REC. 
9, 11 (1937)). 
 63. Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding a towing company did not 
fall clearly within both the terms and spirit of the FLSA’s exemption for retail or service 
establishments). 
 64. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 394 n.11; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 391 
(9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 67. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1557 
(1998) (“The plain meaning of a text as applied to a set of facts is the focal point for attention, 
whether one is a textualist, intentionalist, or pragmatic interpreter of statutes.”). 
 68. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
 69. Id. at 843–44. The rationale behind agency deference boils down to two concepts: 
competence and delegation. Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent and Deference 
to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1999). The first point 
rests on the contention that an agency has greater expertise of the subject matter it covers, which 
should make it more competent than a court to clarify the ambiguous language. Id. The second 
point flows out of the belief that if Congress did not expressly address an issue, it left the power 
to the appropriate agency to handle those details. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44) (“If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority 
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”). 
 70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44 (deciding to defer to the agency interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute); see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 569 (1985) (“[C]ourts do not necessarily abdicate a Marshallian duty to 
‘say what the law is’ by deferring to agencies. Courts retain the authority to control administrative 
abuses of power; deferential review simply recasts the question of ‘law’ as whether the agency’s 
interpretation is ‘reasonable.’”). 
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regulation.”71 The interpretation need not be the only one possible, nor does it 
need to be the conclusion the court would have reached if the question had 
originated there without any agency interpretation.72 The court serves as an 
“important check on the agency’s decisionmaking [sic] process, but ultimately 
the agency’s judgment, if reasonable, must prevail.”73 Still, unchecked 
deference to agency decisions could foster political conflict as an agency might 
attempt to change an interpretation created under a previous administration.74 
Although courts interpreting the FLSA should narrowly construe its 
exemptions against the employer, the Secretary has no such limitation and is 
bound solely by the statutory language.75 The fact that an agency’s 
interpretation is provided in a legal brief rather than a federal rule does not 
necessarily make it unworthy of deference,76 although this interpretation may 
 
 71. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citation omitted) (finding the Secretary’s 
interpretation, given in an amicus brief, was controlling). 
 72. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. 
 73. Brodsky v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 74. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1180 (2008) (noting that agency decisions “sometimes reflect a partisan perspective”). For 
instance, the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the definition of “clothes” has changed 
twice in the past decade. Under the FLSA, time spent “changing clothes or washing at the 
beginning or end of each workday” is not compensable time and would not be factored into 
measuring a worker’s hours. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). In 1997, under a Democratic administration, the 
Secretary issued an opinion letter explaining that the “plain meaning” of “clothes” did not include 
protective equipment, so workers would be compensated for their time putting on and taking off 
this work equipment. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S 
INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-2, 1 (2010). In 2002, under a Republican administration, the new 
Secretary issued an opinion letter stating that protective equipment should be considered 
“clothes,” so employees would not be compensated for this time. See WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR OPINION LETTER, FLSA2002-2, 3 (2002). In 2010, the 
Department of Labor, under a Democratic administration again, reversed course and reaffirmed 
the 1997 interpretation that “clothes” are different from protective equipment required by law, the 
employer, or the nature of the job. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., 
ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-2, 1 (2010). That document noted the fact that the 
majority of courts that had addressed the issue since the 2002 letter had rejected its interpretation, 
including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 1–2. 
 75. Auer, 519 U.S. at 463 (“A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations 
narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, 
subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.”). 
 76. Id. at 462 (differentiating between a brief providing an interpretation that reflects the 
agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and one that is merely a “post hoc rationalization” in 
which an agency attempts to defend its past action); see also Bigelow v. Dep’t of Def., 217 F.3d 
875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Auer deference does not even require an agency “to 
demonstrate affirmatively that its interpretation represents its fair and considered judgment”). 
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encounter greater scrutiny if the agency is a party to the lawsuit.77 The 
Supreme Court also has found that an agency’s interpretation is not owed 
deference when “instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a 
regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”78 This 
result logically flows from the concept that an agency’s interpretation is 
unnecessary when statutory language is clear, so the interpretation will be used 
only when the statute is unclear.79 Merely repeating the language of an unclear 
statute does nothing to illuminate its intended meaning. 
C. Other Outside Sales Cases 
The reasoning that courts have employed in other outside sales cases, both 
outside and within the pharmaceutical industry, can shed light on the PSRs’ 
situation. The best place to start is Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, which the Ninth 
Circuit considered the “paradigm” outside sales case.80 The employees in 
Jewel Tea were “route salesmen” who distributed tea and coffee products to 
customers, while they also took orders for future deliveries.81 They claimed to 
be merely “delivery men” who should be paid overtime, but the court found 
them exempt because their work was “chiefly devoted to effect sales.”82 They 
spent more time “devoted to salesmanship” than to delivering the goods, and in 
addition, the men received commissions for their sales and were selected for 
their ability as salesmen.83 
In determining whether a “sale” is present, some recent decisions focused 
on the employee’s ability, or lack thereof, to close a sale.84 For those courts, no 
commitment meant no sale.85 Others looked past this inability and focused 
 
 77. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (“Deference to what 
appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating position would be entirely 
inappropriate.”); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 600 F.3d 121, 134 n.11 (2d Cir. 
2010) (refusing to apply Auer deference to the interpretation of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue when the Commissioner was a party to the lawsuit). 
 78. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 244, 257 (2006) (deciding not to defer to the 
Attorney General’s Interpretive Rule when its language was the “near equivalen[t]” of the 
statute); see also N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 620 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the 
disputed rules “essentially parrot” the statute’s language). 
 79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 80. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 397 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 
S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 81. Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 203 (10th Cir. 1941). 
 82. Id. at 208. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that military 
recruiters who “sold” the idea of enlisting were not outside salespeople because they could not 
“close the sale”). 
 85. Id. at 1227, 1228–29 (explaining that the touchstone for making a sale is “obtaining a 
commitment”). 
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more on the end result.86 For instance, a marketing director at a title company 
merely referred customers to her employer.87 That court, however, emphasized 
the fact that she was still the one credited with the sale, and no further sales 
efforts were necessary after her interaction with customers.88 In addition, the 
court noted that the employee was hired for her sales experience, and her 
compensation was entirely connected to how many orders she provided.89 
Of the dozens of PSR cases, Novartis likely provides the best background 
to understand Christopher. The Novartis Reps, like those at any 
pharmaceutical company, could provide doctors with free samples and drug 
information,90 but they were prevented from selling prescription drugs, either 
to the public or to physicians.91 Since they could not sell drugs, the Reps could 
receive, at most, a non-binding commitment from doctors to prescribe a drug, 
and there was no way to see whether the doctors followed through on that 
commitment.92 The Novartis Reps’ incentives were based on the number of 
prescriptions of their drugs filled within a representative’s territory.93 Each of 
the Reps earned at least $455 per week in base pay.94 Some earned more than 
$100,000 annually, and the average total compensation in 2005 was $91,539.95 
The Reps’ workdays consisted of being in the field from eight a.m. to five 
 
 86. See Gregory v. First Title of Am., Inc., 555 F.3d 1300, 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(finding the employee made sales under the exemption by obtaining orders for services). 
 87. Id. at 1301. 
 88. Id. at 1309. 
 89. Id. 
 90. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1568 (2011). 
 91. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(1). 
 92. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 145. 
 93. Id. at 146. This calculation required some estimation because not all pharmacies 
participate with the reporting services that track this information for the pharmaceutical 
companies. Id. For example, Novartis received data covering only about seventy-two percent of 
sales and extrapolated from there. Id. 
 94. Id. This figure has no effect on whether the outside sales exemption would apply. See 29 
C.F.R. § 541.500(c) (explaining that the salary requirements for other exemptions in this section 
do not apply to outside sales employees). The $455 level is important, however, for the other 
FLSA exemptions. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(1) (setting $455 per week as the baseline for an 
employee to qualify under the executive exemption); 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(1) (setting the same 
level for the administrative exemption); 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a)(1) (setting the same level for the 
professional exemption). 
 95. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 146. The $100,000 level is relevant because it could allow an 
otherwise non-exempt employee to be exempt. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a). Under that section, an 
employee with at least $100,000 in total annual compensation who “customarily and regularly 
performs any one or more of the exempt duties” required under the executive, administrative, or 
professional exemptions would be exempt from overtime pay. Id. Further, the regulation comes 
close to setting a presumption that an employee compensated at that level is exempt. See id. § 
541.601(c) (“A high level of compensation is a strong indicator of an employee’s exempt status, 
thus eliminating the need for a detailed analysis of the employee’s job duties.”). 
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p.m., and they also occasionally attended mandatory dinner events that would 
last until nine or ten p.m.96 
The trial court in Novartis decided that excluding the Reps from exemption 
would “ignore[] the Act’s spirit, purpose, and goals.”97 It reasoned that “Reps 
make sales in the sense that sales are made in the pharmaceutical industry.”98 
The appellate court, after receiving the Secretary’s amicus brief, reversed the 
decision and deferred to the agency’s interpretation that the Reps were not 
exempt.99 The court found the interpretation was consistent with the 
regulations because someone who “merely promotes a product that will be sold 
by another person does not, in any sense intended by the regulations, make the 
sale.”100 The court also found the interpretation was not erroneous: “[a]lthough 
the phrase ‘other disposition’ is a catch-all [sic] that could have an expansive 
connotation, we see no error in the regulations’ requirement that any such 
‘other disposition’ be ‘in some sense a sale.’”101 The court further found the 
interpretation consistent with the call to narrowly construe exemptions to 
remedial statutes.102 Whereas other courts had been willing to declare a 
doctor’s commitment to prescribe sufficient to constitute a sale, the Second 
Circuit in Novartis emphasized that the Secretary’s 2004 guidelines required 
not just any commitment, but a “commitment to buy.”103 PSRs do not receive 
such a commitment; instead, the best they can hope for is a non-binding 
commitment to prescribe.104 The court summarized: 
[W]here the employee promotes a pharmaceutical product to a physician but 
can transfer to the physician nothing more than free samples and cannot 
lawfully transfer ownership of any quantity of the drug in exchange for 
anything of value, cannot lawfully take an order for its purchase, and cannot 
lawfully even obtain from the physician a binding commitment to prescribe it, 
we conclude that it is not plainly erroneous to conclude that the employee has 
not in any sense, within the meaning of the statute or the regulations, made a 
sale.105 
 
 96. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 146. 
 97. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d, 
611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). 
 98. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 650. 
 99. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149. 
 100. Id. at 153. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 154 (emphasis omitted) (citing Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. 
Reg. at 22,162–63. 
 104. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1568 (2011). 
 105. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1032 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1019 
D. Christopher’s Outside Sales Application 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
The Ninth Circuit saw things differently in Christopher despite the fact 
that the Glaxo (SmithKline) PSRs encountered comparable duties and 
limitations.106 When visiting doctors, the Glaxo PSRs provided product 
information and drug samples for a specific “drug bag” of medications, and 
they answered questions about the products.107 The PSRs could not sell 
samples, nor could they take drug orders or negotiate contracts with 
physicians.108 The representatives worked mostly outside the office and often 
worked an additional ten to twenty hours each week outside normal business 
hours.109 When hiring PSRs, the company sought applicants with previous 
sales experience.110 Glaxo aimed for an ideal compensation breakdown that 
would provide seventy-five percent of a PSR’s compensation in salary, with 
the other twenty-five percent based on incentives.111 These incentives were 
calculated by increases in market share, sales volume, sales revenue, and dose 
volume for products within a PSR’s territory.112 Based on these facts, the Ninth 
Circuit determined the PSRs qualified as outside salespeople, making them 
ineligible for overtime pay.113 
Reaching this conclusion required the court first to decide it need not defer 
to the Secretary’s interpretation. It relied on Gonzales v. Oregon to determine 
that an agency is not owed deference when its interpretation merely 
paraphrases statutory language, since the agency would not be using any 
expertise to interpret the statute.114 The Ninth Circuit found that to be the case 
here.115 The court said the Secretary’s regulation provided no additional 
guidance, such as factors or a test to help determine whether a “sale” is 
 
 106. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 387–88 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (noting that PSRs’ work generally was the same throughout the industry 
and had changed very little over the previous sixty years). 
 107. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 386. The defendant corporation does business as 
GlaxoSmithKline, so the Christopher court routinely referred to the employer as Glaxo. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 387. 
 112. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 387. 
 113. Id. at 400–01. 
 114. Id. at 393 (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not 
acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and 
experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory 
language.”)). 
 115. Id. at 395 (“The failure to add specificity to the statutory scheme that troubled the 
Gonzales Court, indeed the ‘parroting’ of statutory language, is present in the Secretary’s outside 
sales regulations.”). 
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present, and it merely directed employers back to the statute.116 The court 
reasoned it could not give Auer deference to such an interpretation.117 
Once it decided not to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation, the Ninth 
Circuit was free to interpret the language itself, and it concluded that PSRs “in 
some sense make a sale.”118 The court relied on the Act’s inclusion of “other 
disposition[s]” to find the definition covered PSR activities.119 Although other 
courts had avoided this result because doctors’ commitments to prescribe drugs 
are non-binding,120 the Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant that the doctors are not 
legally bound.121 It determined that the transaction still amounted to a 
“meaningful exchange” between the Reps and doctors, and this exchange was 
enough to treat it as a transaction covered by the statute.122 
Although the FLSA is to be narrowly construed against the employer, the 
court sidestepped this hurdle by declaring that the “general principle does not 
 
 116. Id. at 394–95 (“A definition dependent almost entirely on Congress’s seventy-two-year 
old statutory language is not an example of the DOL employing its ‘expertise’ to elucidate 
meaning to which we owe Auer deference.”). 
 117. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395 (“Given the admonition in Gonzales, we are unable to 
accord Auer deference to a regulation written in this manner . . . . Were we to accept the 
Secretary’s offer, and give controlling deference even where there exists no meaningful 
regulatory language to interpret, we would unduly expand Auer’s [sic] applicability to 
interpretations of statutes expressed for the first time in case-by-case amicus filings.”). 
 118. Id. at 395–96 (citing Defining the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,122 (Apr. 23, 
2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541)). 
 119. Id. at 395 (citing Steven I. Locke, The Fair Labor Standards Acts Exemptions and the 
Pharmaceuticals Industry: Are Sales Representatives Entitled to Overtime?, 13 BARRY L. REV. 1, 
25 (2009) (“Applying these [common-usage] definitions, it is logical to conclude that the term 
‘other disposition,’ as it is used to define a ‘sale’ under the Act, includes a physician’s decision to 
write a prescription for a particular medication.”)). 
 120. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1568 (2011) (emphasizing that the commitment required is one “to buy,” not a non-binding 
commitment to prescribe); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 308, 
322 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding no commitment because PSRs did not take orders from doctors); 
Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(wondering what a commitment would entail since doctors remain free to prescribe any 
medication they think will help an individual patient). 
 121. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 396; see also Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 663 F. Supp. 
2d 674, 686 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]o the extent that sales are made in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Ms. Schaefer-LaRose made sales whenever she received commitments from physicians to 
prescribe Lilly drugs.”). 
 122. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 396 (quoting Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669, 
681 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 372 F. App’x 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
332 (U.S. 2010) (“This Court believes that other courts, and perhaps regulatory agencies, 
underestimate the significance of this oral commitment from physicians . . . . Sometimes lawyers 
and judges forget that a person’s word means something; remarkably, many people do not 
actually need a 400-page contract to bind themselves to their word.”)). 
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mean that every word must be given a rigid, formalistic interpretation.”123 The 
court considered its interpretative approach to be commonsensical,124 and it 
found the rationale for using the exemption as “apparent” as it was in Jewel 
Tea.125 
2. The Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority Agrees 
Before interpreting the provisions, the Court had to decide not to defer to 
the agency’s interpretation. The majority opinion listed a number of reasons 
for finding Auer deference unwarranted. For one, although the Department of 
Labor’s conclusion had remained the same since 2009, its reasoning had 
changed after the Court granted certiorari.126 In addition, the Court found no 
“fair warning,” given that the interpretation would impose massive liability on 
Glaxo for conduct that had occurred before the agency’s interpretation had 
been advanced.127 The majority found it particularly noteworthy that for 
decades the Department never initiated any enforcement related to detailers’ 
lack of overtime pay.128 It emphasized that although it is possible an entire 
industry could escape the agency’s notice for a long time, it is much more 
plausible that the activity was never considered unlawful.129 The majority 
determined that “[o]ther than acquiescence, no explanation for the DOL’s 
inaction is plausible.”130 
The majority examined the Department’s interpretation with fresh eyes and 
found it “quite unpersuasive.”131 The agency’s brief for the Court argued that 
its sales regulation, § 541.501(b), required a transfer of title in order to have a 
“sale,” but the Court found no such requirement.132 A consignment for sale 
includes no transfer of title, but it is clearly included in the “sale” definition.133 
The Court concluded that the regulation merely notes that a transaction 
involving a transfer of title would be included in a “sale,” not that it is 
 
 123. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 397. 
 124. Id. at 395–96. 
 125. Id. at 398 (quoting Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 208 (10th Cir. 1941) (“To 
apply hourly standards primarily devised for an employee on a fixed hourly wage is incompatible 
with the individual character of the work of an outside salesman.”). 
 126. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2165–66 (2012). 
 127. Id. at 2168 (“It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an 
agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another to require regulated 
parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held liable when the agency 
announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands 
deference.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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necessary for a sale.134 The Department suggested that the Court could look 
past that regulation and focus instead on its promotional work regulation, § 
541.503(a).135 The Court found that regulation’s interpretation depended 
almost entirely on the “flawed” transfer-of-title reasoning.136 These 
determinations left the Court free to perform its own independent interpretation 
of the FLSA. 
In examining the Act’s text, the majority emphasized the part of the 
definition that looks for people employed “in the capacity of” outside 
salesmen, and it reasoned that this language favored a functional rather than 
formal inquiry.137 The federal regulation provided other textual clues, 
including use of the word “includes” rather than “means.”138 The language 
choice significantly hinted at a non-exhaustive list, particularly since the Act 
used “means” in other instances in order to limit lists to the items enumerated 
within them.139 The majority found the word “any” was best read as “one or 
some indiscriminately of whatever kind,” since the Act included both sales and 
transactions that would not technically be sales, such as exchanges or 
consignments to sell.140 The final textual clue was one the Ninth Circuit 
advanced: the inclusion of “other disposition” as a catchall.141 Although the 
majority said it agreed that the rule of ejusdem generis142 should be applied, it 
found the Department’s interpretation of “other disposition” too narrow.143 If 
the phrase was meant to include only “contract[s] for the exchange of goods or 
services in return for value,” as the Department argued, then there would be 
nothing caught by this term that had not already been covered by other terms in 
the list.144 Instead, the majority took a functional reading of this term to allow 
industry-by-industry variations.145 It found no requirement for a narrower 
construction and argued away Arnold by saying it was inappropriate where the 
interpretation was for a general definition applied throughout the Act.146 No 
support was provided for this contention, which was dropped inside a footnote. 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2170–72. 
 136. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 2170–71. 
 141. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171. 
 142. The Latin phrase is translated as meaning “of the same kind.” Sports Graphics, Inc. v. 
United States, 24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 143. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. The dissent found no need for such an industry-specific approach, saying it was 
“wrong to assume” that “there is in nearly every industry an outside salesman lurking somewhere 
(if only we can find him).” Id. at 2179 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 2172 n.21 (majority opinion). 
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This broader definition for “other dispositions” was enough for the majority to 
find PSRs made “sales” and qualified for the outside salesman exemption.147 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority noted that PSRs “bear all of the 
external indicia” of salespeople, such as being hired for their sales experience, 
working away from the office, and being compensated with significant 
incentive pay.148 The majority said their decision also better met the purpose of 
the Act’s exemption, given Reps’ significant compensation, and that it made 
no sense to exclude PSRs based on a technicality specific to their industry.149 
The conservative majority even acknowledged a pragmatic view, explaining 
that “it would be challenging, to say the least, for pharmaceutical companies to 
compensate detailers for overtime going forward without significantly 
changing the nature of that position.”150 
3. The Liberal Justices’ Dissent 
The dissent agreed that the Department’s interpretation of its regulations, 
advanced by the Solicitor General during oral argument, should not be given 
favorable weight.151 When the dissenters interpreted the provisions, though, 
they found the Reps’ primary duty was not “making sales,” so Reps should 
receive overtime pay.152 The detailer may convince a doctor to prescribe a drug 
for certain types of patients, but in the end, the pharmacist is the one who sells 
the drug.153 
The dissent looked at the specific language of the statute and noted that the 
Reps do not “sell,” “exchange,” or even “dispose” of the product to doctors.154 
Instead detailers inform doctors about the drugs and explain their uses and 
limitations.155 At most, the doctor may give the Rep a non-binding 
commitment to prescribe the drugs where appropriate, and the patient then may 
take the doctor’s prescription and use it to buy that drug.156 The dissent 
highlighted two relevant pieces of data about this process: (1) thirty percent of 
patients over a two-year period had not filled a prescription they received from 
a doctor,157 and (2) seventy-five percent of prescriptions that are filled are done 
 
 147. Id. at 2172. 
 148. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2172–73. 
 149. Id. at 2172 n.23. 
 150. Id. at 2173. 
 151. Id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 2175–76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 153. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2176. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (citing The Public on Prescription Drugs and Pharmaceutical Companies, HARVARD 
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH ET AL. 3 (2008), http:// www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7748.pdf). 
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with generic drugs, not brand-name drugs.158 In other words, even when a Rep 
is successful at the doctor’s office, that performance does not come close to 
guaranteeing a sale of the promoted drug. A commitment to advise a client to 
buy a product is not the same as a commitment to sell a product.159 
Given this view of the process, the dissent found no difficulty in describing 
the Reps’ work as promotional work, not sales. The dissent mentioned three 
sources supporting this view: (1) the PhRMA Code, (2) a 1940 Department of 
Labor report, and (3) a Wage and Hour Division report from 1949.160 The 
Code emphasized that Reps deliver information to doctors, who remain totally 
free to rely solely on their medical judgment to meet patients’ needs.161 Thus, 
the industry itself recognized that a Rep’s primary duty could not be to make 
nonbinding commitments, since these commitments would be irrelevant when 
it came time to prescribe treatment for a patient.162 If Drug D was the best 
option, the dissent said, that is what the doctor would prescribe regardless of 
any commitments made.163 The 1940 report noted: (1) Detailers “‘pav[e] the 
way’ for sales by others,” (2) “‘[t]hey do not make actual sales,’” and (3) “they 
‘‘are admittedly not outside salesmen.’’”164 The 1949 report clarified the 
distinction between promotion and sales and suggested the question in close 
cases was whether the salesman is “actually engaged in activities directed 
toward the consummation of his own sales, at least to the extent of obtaining a 
commitment to buy from the person to whom he is selling.”165 Reps can 
neither consummate their own sales nor receive a commitment to buy from 
doctors. The dissent found these points more compelling than the majority’s 
argument for an industry-specific exception, concluding that 
[g]iven the fact that the doctor buys nothing, the fact that the detailer sells 
nothing to the doctor, and the fact that any “nonbinding commitment” by the 
doctor must, of ethical necessity, be of secondary importance, there is nothing 
 
 158. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2176 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
OFFICE OF SCIENCE & DATA POLICY, EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 2 (2010)). 
 159. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2177. 
 160. Id. at 2177–78. 
 161. Id. at 2177 (citing PHRMA, Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals 2 
(2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/108/phrma_marketing_code_ 
2008pdf). 
 162. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2177. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2178 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER AT HEARINGS PRELIMINARY TO REDEFINITION 
46 (1940)). 
 165. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS OF REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 83 
(1949)). 
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about the detailer’s visit with the doctor that makes the visit (or what occurs 
during the visit) “tantamount . . . to a paradigmatic sale.”166 
The weakest part of the dissent is the final paragraph, which addresses the 
majority’s claim that treating Reps as outside salesmen fits with the purpose of 
the Act’s exemptions. Here, the dissenters muster only a brief positivist 
argument (although they likely would not identify it as such) that detailers 
simply do not fall within the regulation’s definitions.167 The dissent avoids 
trying to support the premise that the exemption should help well-paid Reps 
get paid even better. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Agency’s Interpretation Was Not Entitled to Deference 
The statutory definition of “sale”—any sale, exchange, contract to sell, 
consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition—is ambiguous 
when applied to the pharmaceutical sales setting.168 It does not plainly identify 
whether a Rep’s attempt to sell doctors on prescribing certain drugs—an 
activity that includes the disposition of product information and samples 
potentially in exchange for a non-binding commitment—constitutes a “sale.” 
Because of this ambiguity, the court can look at the agency’s interpretation for 
guidance.169 Under its power to “define and delimit” the Act’s terms, the 
Secretary attempted to further define “sale” through a published regulation,170 
and the agency’s interpretation of that regulation would be entitled to 
deference so long as it was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”171 The interpretation also needed to show the agency using its 
expertise, not simply repeating the statutory language.172 
At first glance, little distinguishes the definition provided in the second 
sentence of the regulation from the statute.173 In fact, the Secretary’s definition 
explains that “[s]ection 3(k) of the Act states.”174 Not only does that portion of 
the regulation mirror the statutory language, but it expressly notes that it is 
 
 166. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2179 (citation omitted). 
 167. See id. at 2179–80. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 14–19. 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 69–73. 
 170. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2011). 
 171. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 172. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
 173. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (“Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ 
includes any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other 
disposition.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (“‘Sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, exchange, contract to 
sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”). 
 174. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (emphasis added). 
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doing just that: repeating the statute’s language.175 It would not be difficult to 
argue that, like in Gonzalez, the regulation simply “parrots” the statute.176 But 
it is an unnecessary argument. Reliance on Auer is sufficient, since an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulation is not entitled to deference when it is 
inconsistent with the regulation. 
Although the “transfer of title” language does differentiate the regulation 
from the statute, it does so in a way that contradicts the statute. As Justice Alito 
explained, a regulation that requires a transfer of title in order to recognize a 
sale cannot be consistent with a statute that explicitly states that consignments 
for sale are considered sales.177 A consignment for sale involves no transfer of 
title from the consignee to the consignor; the title is transferred only to the 
eventual buyer. When considering this point in conjunction with the practical 
implications of granting deference in this instance,178 the Court had no problem 
finding the DOL interpretation “plainly lack[ed] the hallmarks of thorough 
consideration” and declined to provide Auer deference.179 
B. PSRs Do Not Fall Plainly and Unmistakably Within the Exemption’s 
Terms 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized a “common-sense understanding” to find 
that PSRs make sales “in some sense.”180 The Supreme Court’s majority used a 
similar approach, calling for a “functional” interpretation of the statute’s 
terms.181 After all, both the employer and employee frequently refer to PSRs’ 
 
 175. Id. As the Ninth Circuit noted, this definition, in effect, explains that “a ‘sale’ means a 
‘sale.’” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 394 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 
S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 176. Of course, the opposing side would argue that someone interpreting the regulation 
cannot simply gloss over its first sentence, which explains that “sales” include a “transfer of title 
to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible 
property.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). The two sentences cannot and should not be read separately, 
but instead as one unit. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008) (setting forth as a 
cardinal rule of construction the requirement to read a statute as a harmonious whole). The 
“transfer” language is completely unique to this interpretation and should not be discarded; it 
provides a meaningful limitation on what can be considered a sale. In fact, the Second Circuit 
found it “clear” that the inclusion of the “transfer of title” section, as well as the portion defining 
and delimiting “outside salesman” in relation to promoting products, did “far more than merely 
parrot” the FLSA’s language. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 131–136. 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 127–130. 
 179. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 (2012). 
 180. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 395–97 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 181. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170. 
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activity as “sales.”182 The Reps’ job title alone shows some acknowledgment 
that their work could constitute sales; Glaxo was not being sued by 
pharmaceutical “promotions” representatives.183 As the Ninth Circuit 
explained: 
Plaintiffs suggest that despite being hired for their sales experience, being 
trained in sales methods, encouraging physicians to prescribe their products, 
and receiving commission-based compensation tied to sales, their job cannot 
“in some sense” be called selling. This view ignores the reality of the nature of 
the work of detailers, as it has been carried out for decades.184 
If Congress had wanted a strict definition of sales, the argument goes, it would 
not have included the rest of the terms in the statutory definition.185 A strict 
reading would make those other terms superfluous, a result that should be 
avoided since courts are asked to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and 
word of a statute.”186 
However, using a strict construction hardly makes the verbiage 
superfluous. The Second Circuit suggested another canon of statutory 
interpretation, ejusdem generis, which provides a competing view.187 Under 
this rule, “where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the 
general words are read as applying only to other items akin to those 
specifically enumerated.”188 Thus, “other dispositions” should not be read as a 
broad catchall, but limited by the preceding terms, which all refer to a type of 
sale. This interpretive approach also better follows the call to narrowly 
construe the Act’s exemptions, another rule of statutory interpretation.189 This 
approach is further validated by examining the common definition of the term 
“disposition.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “the act of transferring 
something to another’s care or possession, esp. by deed or will; the 
relinquishing of property.”190 Merriam-Webster’s provides a similar definition 
 
 182. See, e.g., Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390–91 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(noting that the term “sales” permeates descriptions of PSR work by both drug companies and 
their employees and further finding the plaintiff himself admitted he considered his work 
“selling”). 
 183. Nevertheless, some writers prefer to describe PSR activities as “ethical promotion.” See, 
e.g., Robert F. Wright & William J. Lundstrom, Physicians’ Perceptions of Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives: A Model for Analysing the Customer Relationship, 4 INT’L J. OF MED. 
MARKETING 29, 34 (2004). Further, the statute pays no attention to job titles. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 
(“A job title alone is insufficient to establish the exempt status of an employee.”). 
 184. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 396. 
 185. See KIM, supra note 176, at 12–13. 
 186. Id.  (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). 
 187. See KIM, supra note 176, at 10. 
 188. Id. (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980)). 
 189. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1568 (2011). 
 190. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (9th ed. 2009). 
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for the term “dispose”: “to transfer or give away.”191 Even if a doctor’s non-
binding commitment to prescribe drugs is a “meaningful exchange,”192 it is 
difficult to see how this exchange fits within those provided dictionary 
definitions. 
Despite agreeing that ejusdem generis should guide its interpretation of the 
statute, the Court’s majority reached a different result, claiming the DOL’s 
suggested application of the canon was too narrow.193 The majority argued that 
Congress intended to broadly define “sale,” so “other dispositions” should be 
treated similarly.194 The opinion further explained that ejusdem generis should 
not be used to “obscure and defeat the intent and purpose of Congress.”195 Two 
things are striking about this reasoning. First, the Court essentially states that 
“other dispositions” is self-defining; Congress purportedly included it in the 
definition of sales in order to create a broader definition, and thus, “other 
dispositions” should also be broadly defined. This argument seems circular. 
More troubling, the assertion that what the majority terms a “narrow” 
construction of “other disposition” would defeat Congress’s intent completely 
ignores the Court’s treatment of exemptions in remedial legislation—such 
treatment claims that narrow constructions of exemptions are required in these 
instances to effectuate the legislation’s purpose.196 This contradiction is not a 
problem only for this specific case. The majority’s disregard of a narrow 
construction of the exemption calls into question the continued relevance of 
Arnold and the Court’s likely approach to future FLSA exemption 
challenges.197 It creates the potential for more employer-friendly results. 
Whether one tends to side with employers or employees on these disputes is 
irrelevant; the problem is the Court seems to be overriding Congress’s intent, 
or at least the way it has defined Congress’s intent in the FLSA realm for the 
past half-century. 
C. What About the Exemption’s Spirit? 
Nevertheless, the dissent’s conclusion—that Reps are entitled to overtime 
pay—would also have created an unsatisfying result. Although it would have 
stayed faithful to the statutory language, it would have overlooked the FLSA’s 
 
 191. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 568 (2d ed. 2003). 
 192. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 396 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 
S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 193. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2171 (2012). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (quoting United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950)). 
 196. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 197. See David S. Rosenthal & Jeffery Gilbreth, High Court’s FLSA Ruling on Rx Reps: The 
Ray of Hope It Offers Others, 323 FAIR LAB. STANDARDS HANDBOOK FOR STATES, LOC. GOV’T 
& SCH. NEWSL. 5 (Aug. 2012), available at http://prod-admin1.tmg.atex.cniweb.net:8080/file 
server/file/1751/filename/fair2012-08.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1042 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1019 
social purpose.198 Finding PSRs not exempt would have created mixed results, 
at best, in terms of satisfying the Act’s policy: protecting workers “unable to 
protect themselves from excessively low wages and excessively long hours” 
and spreading jobs to the jobless.199 
1. “Excessively Low Wages” 
PSRs are already handsomely rewarded for their work through salaries that 
commonly reach six figures when bonuses are counted.200 The high-salary 
exemptions included in the Secretary’s regulations demonstrate the intent not 
to overly reward employees who already receive significant compensation.201 
Of course, the regulations do exclude outside sales people from the salary 
requirements, so maybe the Secretary would not mind the resulting high pay 
for Reps. This distinction between exemptions may have created the potential 
for significant inconsistencies in the application, though. Some of the better-
paid Reps would fall into the highly compensated exemption as long as the 
employer could show they met at least one portion of any of the other overtime 
exemptions.202 Those employees would not receive overtime pay. Yet, their 
counterparts who fell below the $100,000 mark would not receive that same 
exemption, enabling them to earn overtime pay that could allow them to out-
earn their “highly compensated” coworkers.203 
Besides, if the Act was meant to protect workers who could not protect 
themselves from low wages, allowing the law to benefit workers who make 
 
 198. Nicholson v. World Bus. Network, Inc., 105 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 1997) (“To read 
the FLSA blindly, without appreciation for the social goals Congress sought, would also do 
violence to the FLSA’s spirit.”). 
 199. LINDER, supra note 18, at 48; see also supra notes 33–37, 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. But see Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 372 F. 
App’x 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 332 (2010) (finding PSRs exempt from 
the FLSA’s overtime provisions even in cases where the plaintiff worked up to 70 hours per week 
and made as little as $63,000 in base salary). 
 201. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 202. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a). 
 203. Further highlighting the ridiculousness of this inconsistency is the fact that once a non-
exempt employee receives enough overtime pay within a fifty-two-week period to push the past 
year’s compensation above $100,000, then that employee could be classified with his highly 
compensated peers who are exempt from overtime. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(b)(2). That 
designation might be fleeting, though. If the employee, no longer earning overtime pay, dips back 
below $100,000 for the previous fifty-two-week period, that person no longer would fit through 
the highly compensated loophole, which makes the employee non-exempt and eligible for 
overtime pay again. See id. 
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nearly twice as much as the average American household seems counter to the 
Act’s purpose.204 Reps do not need overtime pay to help protect them. 
2. “Excessively Long Hours” and Job-Spreadings 
Low wages are not a concern, but PSRs do contend with long hours. The 
white-collar exemptions are partially based on the belief that these employees’ 
duties are difficult to spread, so forcing employers to pay overtime would not 
help create jobs.205 Although a drug-maker could always shrink a Rep’s sales 
territory and hire more employees to cover parts of the Rep’s former area, 
territory size is not what leads Reps to work overtime. They work those hours 
because their job requires them to attend dinners where they can more 
successfully engage with doctors outside the hospital or office setting.206 
Shrinking a Rep’s territory would have no effect on the necessity of them 
attending these events. Still, if a Rep’s time at these evening events is 
counterbalanced by fewer work hours during the day, there might be a need for 
more Reps to handle the missed daytime assignments. Under this view, making 
Reps eligible for overtime might make some sense for the purpose of spreading 
employment. 
From a practical standpoint, though, any talk about potential job spreading 
in the industry must face the reality that drugmakers are more likely these days 
to find other methods to promote their drugs.207 The irony in the application of 
this “remedial” legislation is that, rather than benefitting the workers, finding 
PSRs deserve overtime pay actually would have further destabilized their 
already tenuous position. It would threaten additional job losses and other 
worker-unfriendly industry changes.208 Further, ex-employees, as opposed to 
current workers, have little to lose from suing their former employer.209 Thus, 
the contraction of the market potentially would create a cyclical effect of 
continued industry downsizing. Companies, focused on the bottom line, lay off 
PSRs, who then sue the company for unpaid overtime. The company, forced to 
pay tens or even hundreds of millions in unpaid overtime claims, then seeks 
ways to improve the bottom line, which likely involves eliminating more sales 
representatives. In the end, a statute aimed at helping employees actually helps 
 
 204. The median annual household income in the United States was $49,445 in 2011. Income, 
Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Sept. 
13, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html. 
 205. See supra note 46; see also Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
22,124. 
 206. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 208. See infra Part III.C. 
 209. See supra note 13. 
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former employees while putting current employees at risk.210 That result totally 
contradicts the Act’s spirit. 
III.  NON-JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
The Court’s decision in Christopher provides much-needed clarity for the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as serving as strong guidance for similarly 
regulated industries, such as the medical device field. However, the majority 
opinion creates new questions for the future, such as the proper construction of 
other FLSA exemptions. What other definitions could be considered general 
ones in order to avoid Arnold’s call for narrow construction? In addition, the 
result hardly weds the terms and spirit of the outside sales exemption in this 
context. The ideal solution here likely resided outside the judicial branch. 
A. The Secretary Could Have Expanded the Definition of Sale 
Congress specifically chose the Secretary to fill any gaps related to the 
Act’s exemptions,211 and the DOL is better positioned to fill those gaps than 
the Court.212 The Secretary could have given it another shot and more 
accurately defined what constitutes a “sale” or an “outside salesperson” in the 
pharmaceutical context.213 At least one author has suggested massively 
changing the definition to create a special exclusion for PSRs.214 
The problem is that the Secretary’s interpretation, as argued in the 
Department’s amicus brief, was no better than the Second Circuit’s outcome: 
Reps would get overtime. It is unclear why the Secretary would suddenly 
decide to support finding PSRs exempt. If the Department merely wanted to 
have the courts interpret the Act consistently with the express language, a 
revised definition could have been a workable option. However, that solution 
likely ignores the political and policy undercurrents of finding Reps eligible for 
overtime. Remember, the FLSA was passed at a time of high unemployment as 
a way to force companies to spread work and create more jobs.215 Today, at a 
time when the nation’s unemployment rate has remained above seven percent 
since December 2008, the administration might desire a return to a more 
forceful execution of the FLSA as an attempt to help get more people 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see also supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Daniel Lovejoy, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency 
Statutes, 88 VA. L. REV. 879, 888 (2002). 
 213. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 214. Bryan D. Sullivan, Reconciling the Terms and Spirit of the Law: Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives and the FLSA Outside-Sales Exemption, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1447 (2011). 
 215. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942). 
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working.216 Of course, this reasoning ignores the climate of the industry; 
pharmaceutical companies would be more likely to respond by cutting jobs 
than by adding them.217 
B. Congress Could Have Amended the Act 
The Novartis court, likely not fully pleased with the end result of its 
analysis, explicitly mentioned the legislative option: “To the extent that the 
pharmaceuticals industry wishes to have the concept of ‘sales’ expanded . . . it 
should direct its efforts to Congress, not the courts.”218 Congress has already 
amended the Act dozens of times; for instance, any increase in the national 
minimum wage requires amending the FLSA.219 One such amendment, in 
1990, added computer systems analysts, computer programmers, and software 
engineers as exempt employees.220 The benefit of this type of fix is that it 
would have completely avoided the problem of trying to classify PSRs within 
the current exemptions; a new one designed specifically for them could have 
been created. 
C. Or the Pharmaceutical Industry Could Have Adapted 
Even without judicial clarification, drugmakers could have responded by 
altering Reps’ job requirements and expectations to ensure they would not be 
eligible for overtime regardless of their designation.221 These changes would 
have required an increased amount of oversight, possibly to an extent that 
 
 216. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (Oct. 5, 2012), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000. 
 217. See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text. 
 218. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1568 (2011); see also KIM, supra note 176, at 2 (“[T]he Court recognizes that legislative 
power resides in Congress, and that Congress can legislate away interpretations with which it 
disagrees.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–28 § 8102, 121 Stat 112 
(2007). 
 220. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17). 
 221. This transformation has already begun as part of the overall restructuring of the industry. 
See, e.g., The Evolution of Pharmaceutical Sales: New Models for a Changing Environment, IMS 
HEALTH (February 2008), http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/ 
Document/Sales%20and%20Marketing%20Effectiveness%20TL/Evolution_PharmaSales_new_
models_changing_environment_PEE.pdf. Potential industry changes could include smaller 
territories to decrease employee travel time during the day and stricter oversight of employees’ 
time. See Mike Wokasch, New Work Rules for Pharmaceutical Representatives, PHARMA 
REFORM, (July 27, 2011), http://www.pharmareform.com/2011/07/27/new-work-rules-for-phar 
maceutical-sales-representatives. This new oversight likely would involve “punching a clock” in 
order to account for time worked, as well as time spent for personal use, breaks, or lunch. Id. 
Some employers might go so far as to install GPS systems in employee’s cars in order to track 
them throughout the day. Id. 
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employees would consider it micromanaging.222 Altered duties could also help 
employers make the case that even if Reps are not outside salesmen, they fit 
another FLSA exemption, such as the one for administrative employees. 
Numerous courts had shown a willingness to embrace that argument for 
PSRs.223 Further, thanks to the exemption for highly compensated workers, a 
minor tweak would be enough for some employees to be found exempt. The 
downside, of course, is that companies seek clarity, not continued litigation, 
which is what they would have faced even if they changed worker 
responsibilities enough to merit applying another exemption. 
An hourly employee who works sixty hours in a week, which is not 
uncommon in this field, would have earned as much in overtime pay as in 
regular weekly salary. Reps would have been unlikely to cash in, though. 
Besides altering Reps’ work hours so that they do not receive overtime pay, 
drugmakers also likely would have restructured how they compensate Reps.224 
Companies might have cut base salaries or reduced, if not totally eliminated, 
incentive-based compensation. Companies opting for the latter would no 
longer have rewarded Reps for the quality of their work, but instead by the 
quantity of hours they put into it. That change would have been a tough sell for 
both employers and employees. Employers would have been reluctant to make 
the change because the first one to do it likely would suffer a significant loss of 
talent. After all, the most successful sellers are the ones who benefit the most 
from incentive-based bonuses, and they might decide to join a competitor that 
retained its incentive-based compensation structure. Ironically, employees 
would take the biggest hit. Besides uncertainty about their pay moving 
forward, Reps also might find themselves on the corporate chopping block. 
Layoffs may have been a common answer for companies seeking to prevent a 
further hit to the bottom line.225 Although the industry had a number of 
potential responses, few of these potential changes would have been favorable 
for employees. 
 
 222. Wokasch, supra note 221. 
 223. See, e.g., Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 372 F. App’x 246, 248–50 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 332 (2010) (finding no need to address whether the plaintiff fell under the 
outside salesperson exemption since the court had determined the administrative exemption was 
applicable); Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the trial 
court’s decision that although the outside sales exemption did not apply, the administrative 
exemption did). But see In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 157 (finding the representatives did not 
exhibit the necessary discretion and independent judgment to meet the administrative exemption); 
Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22, 30 (D. Conn. 2011) (where defendant 
followed an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment based on the outside sales exemption 
with a similarly unsuccessful motion based on the administrative exemption). 
 224. Scott, supra note 8. 
 225. Vanishing, supra note 4. 
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CONCLUSION 
Federal law prohibits direct sales of prescription drugs to the users. Thus, 
pharmaceutical sales representatives must settle for promoting the product to 
physicians, who can prescribe it to patients, who may or may not purchase that 
brand-name drug. This activity should not meet the definition of “making 
sales” that the FLSA requires for an employee to be exempt from receiving 
overtime pay, particularly if the Court had followed Arnold’s call for narrowly 
construing FLSA exemptions. When the Court examined the statute’s text, it 
should have found that PSRs are entitled to overtime compensation. That 
result, though true to the terms of the FLSA’s outside sales exemption under 
the usually applied narrow construction, would have run counter to the purpose 
behind the overtime pay law and its exceptions. In addition, while some 
employees—and mostly former employees—would have gained a windfall 
from receiving back pay for unpaid overtime, that decision really would have 
been a long-term loss for PSRs. If the Court had found Reps were entitled to 
overtime, the Reps likely would have faced continued downsizing, altered job 
requirements, and reduced guaranteed compensation. This issue presented 
numerous alternative responses, with the best option being Congress revisiting 
the FLSA to add an exemption exclusively for Reps. However, rather than 
waiting for others to respond to the problem, the Court issued a pragmatic 
decision that provides a reasonable result, even if the reasoning is not the 
soundest. The most disturbing part for workers is the majority’s cold shoulder 
for Arnold, potentially signifying a new approach to FLSA disputes that will be 
much more favorable for employers. 
ROBERT J. HURTT, JR.* 
  
 
* I would like to thank everyone who helped contribute to the publication of this Note, 
particularly Professor Matt Bodie for his guidance and suggestions. Thanks also to Danielle and 
Vivienne Hurtt for all of their love and support throughout the writing (and rewriting) process. 
And a final thanks to the Supreme Court for granting cert in Christopher; although that decision 
led to significant revision of this Note, the final product is better for it. 
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